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There has been considerable concern about systemic factors that
serve as access barriers for vulnerable groups in need of services, but conceptual and empirical work related to such issues have
been limited. This article presents a new conceptual approach
for considering and assessing access, which we call the "Funnel
Framework." The framework is explicated abstractly, and is illustrated with use of the U.S. child care subsidy system. We argue
that the framework can usefully guide the analysis of access to any
social benefit system, and can be helpful to administrators and
program developers as they design and implement benefit systems.
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The extent to which various types of social services and
other public benefits have been available to general populations, and especially to disadvantaged groups, has received
considerable research attention. Resulting indicators of the
percentage of those "in need" that receive selected benefits
have consequently become common. In addition, a literature
has emerged on "barriers" to receipt, as well as on disparities
in the characteristics of persons who do or do not receive benefits (see, for example, Bentele & Nicoli, 2012; Greenberg, 2010;
Herbst, 2008; Kissane, 2010; Li, 2006; Park, Fertig, & Metraux,
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2016, Volume XLIII, Number 2
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2014; Schlay, Weinraub, Harmon, & Tran, 2004; Studts, Stone,
& Barber, 2006). These studies collectively have resulted in the
elaboration of diverse systemic and individual factors that restrict access.
Despite the importance of such issues to policy planners,
administrators, advocates, and researchers, attempts to conceptualize access more generally have been limited and imprecise. This has fostered several problems for those interested in interpreting service access issues. First, interesting
conceptual models have been developed to explain access in
particular service systems (see, for example, Andersen, 1968,
1995; Stiffman, Pescosolido, & Cabassa, 2004), but access conceptualizations across different types of social systems have
been lacking. This has resulted in unnecessary limitations in
conceptual generalizations. Second, the term access itself has
been defined in widely varying ways, which creates difficulties in understanding competing claims about the severity of
access issues. Third, from an empirical standpoint, there have
been relatively few rigorous attempts to systemically evaluate the relative importance of various service access barriers.
Although this limitation derives partially from difficult measurement issues, the explication of a sound conceptual approach may foster meaningful empirical improvements in assessing access.
This article addresses each of these problems, with an emphasis on developing a new conceptual framework for assessing access to a wide array of social benefits. After first discussing selected overarching issues that complicate the evaluation
of service access, we present the conceptual framework, which
categorizes the mechanisms through which persons potentially in need of benefits are eliminated from service receipt. The
U. S. child care subsidy system will be used to illustrate how
the categories we develop may operate in one social service
system. However, the framework can be generalized for use
with any social benefit system. We conclude by discussing how
the suggested framework can guide human services administrators and policymakers as they consider potential service
access difficulties and related ways of improving policies and
administrative practices. We also argue that the framework
can be used to guide empirical research that more precisely
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assesses the importance of various types of access problems.

How Should Access to Services be Defined?
One of the difficulties in comparing access studies is that
they often reflect different points of departure or emphasis. For example, one study may focus on a population subgroup that receives designated benefits through any means,
while another may more narrowly examine the proportion of
persons eligible for a public program that actually receive such
benefits. For example, with respect to child care, the former approach would focus on the mechanisms through which anyone
thought to need child care services received them (i.e., markets,
kin networks, government); the latter approach, rather, would
center on the proportion of those eligible for the Child Care
and Development Fund or Head Start that received these particular public benefits. There is nothing inherently incorrect
with either approach. However, these differing foci should be
clearly understood when comparing studies, as should the fact
that the results of employing one definitional lens rather than
another will result in quite different policy and programmatic
implications.
In this section, we briefly describe two types of definitional
issues that are important in conceptualizing access to services.
These pertain to: (1) measuring the extent of need for services in an entire population; and (2) determining the auspices
through which needed services are provided. Rigorous attention to factors falling within each of these realms will result in
a more informed consideration of access issues in any substantive area.
Defining Need: Estimating Populations with an Access Goal
Determining the relevant population base against which
access assessments are made is a critical first step in considering access issues. Such determinations always entail some
societal conception, either explicitly stated or implied, about
factors associated with need. An initial step in defining service
need therefore involves assessing the personal characteristics
that indicate a need for some form of care or benefit. For our
purposes, we wish to begin by limiting such considerations to
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the characteristics of the service recipient that suggest need,
without considering how the needed service is provided (i.e.,
through family, private markets, or governments).
There are four primary criteria generally used to estimate
the subset of a population that may need a service. These
include: demographic or social characteristics; ties to selected
social statuses, such as work; diagnoses based on functional
criteria; and financial means (Gilbert & Terrell, 2010). We will
discuss each of these criteria in more detail in a later section on
establishing service eligibility criteria.
The important summary point here is that meaningful
discussions of service access must begin by clearly determining the parameters of need. Although it is true that judgments
about such service needs almost always are imprecise, failing to
make educated estimates with documentation of the methods
used severely limits the constructive assessment of service
access. It can result in confusion regarding whether a service
simply is considered unnecessary, or rather whether failures
to obtain a service result from unintended access problems.
Means of Service Provision: Access through Private Markets,
Voluntary Associations, and Public Auspices
Another difficulty in assessing service access involves the
extent to which various service-providing mechanisms are
considered. In general, services may be conceived as being
provided through four primary methods: (1) kinship and
friendship networks; (2) voluntary organizations, including
both religious and non-religious organizations; (3) private proprietary markets; and (4) governmental programs (Gilbert &
Terrell, 2010). In reality, these mechanisms often become quite
mixed, as when a government program pays family members
to provide care for their relatives, or when government services are purchased from nonprofit or proprietary service
providers. Given these complexities, and because of the importance of public provision from a policy standpoint, we will
focus primarily on access to services provided through public
auspices in this paper. Nonetheless, in relatively free-market
economies such as the United States, considerable service
provision occurs through market purchase without direct
government assistance. Prominent examples include the high
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percentages of the population who purchase child care from
private markets solely with their own funds. The government
in such systems typically plays a "residual" role in providing
services to designated portions of populations considered in
need and unable to obtain market-based care.
Assessing access to public services therefore requires at
least some consideration of the often complex and multi-directional interactions between public programs and private
market exchanges. That is, just as perceived inadequacies in
public service provision may stimulate private care seeking,
the scope of government's residual role is influenced by the
extent to which private markets provide access. For example,
when rising costs make market-based child care unaffordable for many families, governments face pressures to increase access to publicly subsidized child care. At the same
time, if government-run child care subsidy programs have
fairly stringent eligibility requirements or are perceived to be
of low quality, larger numbers of persons are forced to seek
help through kinship networks or to purchase whatever child
care they can through private markets. Although interactions
such as these often are very difficult to interpret precisely, they
often matter a great deal both in determining overall access
to services and in assessing the primary mechanisms through
which access is obtained.

The Funnel Framework for
Assessing Access to Public Benefits
In this section, we present a basic conceptual model that
differentiates systematic factors that affect access to public
benefits. The framework is depicted in Figure 1. We refer to
our approach as "The Funnel Framework," which is intended
to metaphorically reflect how populations in need of service
are systematically funneled toward or away from receipt
based on a range of political or bureaucratic mechanisms. Our
approach differs from well-known earlier work by Andersen
(1968, 1995) in that it focuses on macro or systemic factors
that affect access, while treating individual motivations and
proclivities more as residual factors that operate within the
context of broader systems.
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Figure 1: The Funnel Framework of Social Service Access
UNIVERSE OF PERSONS FOR WHOM
A SERVICE CONCEIVABLY IS USEFUL
Voluntary &
private market
recipients

Uncovered
(Direct)

Uncovered
(Indirect)

Uncovered in voluntary or
private markets
Potential Recipient Pool for
Public Programs
Eligibility
(Entitlement Access)
•Demographic and social
characteristics
•Functional status in society
•Diagnostic characteristics
•Financial characteristics
Financial
(Cost-related Access)
•Aggregate funding
(entitlement vs. waiting lists)
•Level of reimbursement
for service providers
•Cost of service transactions
for service recipients

Voluntary &
private market
recipients

Uncovered
(Direct)

Uncovered
(Indirect)

-Minimum cost
-Cost/benefit

•Obligations

Uncovered
(Indirect)

Uncovered
(personal)

Implementation
(Bureaucratic Access)
•Knowledge about
available services
•Ease of applying for
and obtaining services
•Interpersonal treatment
by caseworkers
and other staff
•Convenience of offices/
hours
•Supply issues
Individual
Characteristics

Uncovered
(Indirect)

Uncovered
(personal)

PUBLIC PROGRAM
RECIPIENTS

Our approach is to begin by trying to estimate the broadest population subset that would be considered in need of a
particular service, as is indicated at the top of the figure. We
next discuss selected issues that affect the receipt of services
through private markets, because many systems depend
heavily on private provision and then use public systems to
meet the needs of those not served privately. The many factors
that can preclude receipt of public benefits for persons who
do not receive benefits through private systems then are
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examined in greater detail. The shaded portions of Figure 1
display four sets of factors that are particularly important in
this respect. The first three of these—eligibility, financial, and
implementation factors—all are systemic in nature in that they
are substantially determined by public policy making and
implementation decisions. We treat the final set—individual
factors—as somewhat of a residual category to capture disparities in outcomes that may occur regardless of how well a
system is operating.
Difficulties related to any of these four sets of factors may
result in needy persons not receiving public benefits, as is
denoted in the "uncovered" boxes next to each set of factors;
these uncovered boxes indicate the portion of the potential
pool that are eliminated from service receipt due to the access
factors in question. Collectively, the uncovered boxes represent the portion of the population in need that we consider
to have public benefit access problems. In contrast, if people
negotiate each of these sets of factors without being screened
out, they receive public benefits, as is shown in the bottom of
the figure.
In the following sections, we describe the various access
factors, and provide illustrations of how each may serve to
screen potentially needy and eligible persons from service
receipt. To provide some consistency in presentation, we will
use the U.S. child care system, and especially the Child Care
and Development Fund subsidy program, in illustrating access
factors. A brief introduction follows to provide some minimal
background on this child care system.
Background on the U.S. Child Care System
Child care in the U.S. involves a wide mix of private market
transactions, government tax incentives, and direct government care subsidies. In general, child care by noncustodial
parents is considered to be needed as parents engage in work
or school; the ages at which care is needed may be subject to
debate, but U.S. policy has focused on children under age 13 as
well as older children who have special needs.
Many parents obtain needed care through private
market transactions as well as free help provided by relatives, and a smaller number obtain assistance through their
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workplaces. Government policies intersect with such arrangements primarily in two ways. First, the Child and Dependent
Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) provides federal tax credits up to
$3,000 ($6,000 for two or more children) for childcare expenses
for children under age 13 whose parents work or go to school.
The credit is non-refundable—that is, it can only reduce a family's income tax liability to zero; any additional credit is lost.
As a result, low-income families who owe little or no income
tax get little benefit from the credit.
Second, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF)
provides block grant funding to states to establish child care
subsidy programs. While program rules vary widely across
states, a family must have monthly income below the state determined income eligibility threshold for a family of that size.
Most states set income eligibility limits substantially below the
maximum level allowed by federal law, which is 85% of the
state median income (SMI). Both the mother and the father (if
there is a spouse present) must be either working or attending a job training or educational program and have a child
under age 13 (or older with special needs) in order to receive
subsidies.
Parents receiving subsidies may obtain care in a range of
child care settings, including center care, family child care, and
care in the child's own home. Many states allow noncustodial
family members to be the subsidized caregiver. Assistance is
provided in the form of either a contracted child care slot or a
voucher that may be used to access care by any provider that
meets state requirements. Families typically pay a monthly copayment, based on factors such as income, family size, and the
number of children in care.
The child care subsidies are not a federal entitlement,
meaning that eligible applicants do not necessarily receive
subsidies. Findings from previous studies suggest that, although a large fraction of low-income families are eligible
for child care subsidies, states serve between 15% and 30% of
the eligible population. From fiscal year (FY) 1996 to FY2001,
federal and state funding for subsidized child care increased
from $3.6 billion to $11.2 billion, and then to 14.9 billion in 2012
(Administration for Children and Families, 2014). In 2010, the
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CCDF served approximately 1.7 million children per month
(Office of Child Care, 2012).
Potential Population in Need
We turn next to describing the conceptual framework
more fully, using examples from the child care system outlined above and frequently referencing Figure 1 for explanatory purposes. As previously mentioned, all analyses of access to
services necessarily begin with some conception of the population that needs a particular benefit. Such need determinations
vary dramatically across societies and communities, ranging
from universal access for an entire population to fairly narrow
determinations of need for defined groups. Thinking of child
care in the U.S., for example, it generally is accepted that child
care from a non-custodial parent is needed if the parent(s) are
engaged at least part-time in work or school. Conceptions of
the ages of children for which care is needed vary; they may
range up to the age of 18, but more commonly are considered
as less than 13 in U.S. policy discussions. We will use the latter
convention here, and thus the "universe of persons for whom a
service conceivably is useful" depicted in Figure 1 would refer
to all families with parents working or in school who have
children under age 13.
Options for Obtaining Needed Benefits
The boxes immediately below the "universe" in Figure 1
are meant to signify that this defined population potentially
has multiple options for meeting their needs. Many persons
obtain needed services through private market transactions or
through free assistance from kinship networks, as indicated
by the "private voluntary and market recipients" boxes; such
transactions often are aided by government or employer incentives. For example, a very large portion of child care in the
U.S. is provided through private means, with the Child and
Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) then used by a subset of
these families to defray a portion of the costs.
However, as is well known, private transactions typically do not allow adequate provision for all families, due to
financial limitations and many other difficulties. Those who
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are not able to fully meet needs through private transactions
thus may be viewed as being "uncovered in private markets,"
and in turn they constitute a "potential recipient pool for public
programs." The horizontal arrows in the figure between those
covered or uncovered through private provision denote the
previously mentioned simultaneous influence these sectors
typically have on each other, and the related fact that movement in and out of private provision may be quite fluid; it
is affected by market conditions, the relative generosity of
public provisions, and changing individual incomes and other
circumstances.
Access Through Public Programs
This brings us to a consideration of the various mechanisms in the public decision-making sphere that serve to either
enhance or restrict access for the pool of persons in need of
public services. In general, eligibility requirements tend to restrict access in a direct way, while financial and implementation factors operate more indirectly. We turn next to describing the principal ways in which each of these broad categories
affect service access.
Eligibility (Entitlement access). Some access restrictions are
the deliberate result of policy design, as when governments
limit eligibility for services depending on income or other criteria. This type of conscious and "direct" service access restriction occurs in some instances because persons are not considered sufficiently needy to require public supports. In others,
persons are precluded because it is assumed that they will
receive comparable or at least related services through other
means, usually because of higher incomes or due to being tied
to a status through which benefits are provided (i.e., jobs). In
this sense, people may be restricted from public programs
even though they seemingly are in need and are not receiving services as indicated in Figure 1 through private market
transactions.
The most direct way in which government officials restrict
access in this manner is through the eligibility rules that they
set for programs. We will refer to these types of rules as "entitlement access," in the sense that they establish the boundaries
with respect to the broadest group of persons who may have
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a claim on a benefit. Meeting such initial criteria is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for obtaining benefits.
Before we discuss some of the more general methods of restricting access through eligibility rules, a distinction between
two primary types of programs should be made. In what we
call "strong entitlement programs," a decision has been made
(generally through legislation) that anyone who meets the
defined eligibility rules in fact should be entitled to receive
services. The U.S. Social Security system is a classic example of
a strong entitlement program.
In other programs, which we will term "discretionary programs," eligibility determination only establishes a pool of
persons who may be considered eligible, but those selected for
service from this pool then are further constrained by of variety
of deliberate bureaucratic procedures. In practice, many programs combine elements of these entitlement and discretionary features, in that rules are established that clearly define the
pool of people eligible for services, but limited funding serves
to constrain all people meeting such guidelines from receiving
services. The CCDF is a good example of this, in that eligibility rules for receipt are established, but not all people meeting
these criteria will receive services, even if they apply.
There are many ways in which entitlement to services is directly limited through eligibility rules. Figure 1 indicates four
such categories that are of particular importance: demographic
and social characteristics; functional statuses in society; diagnostic characteristics; and financial characteristics. Although
we describe each of these separately, it is important to note
that programs often include combinations of these criteria.
Demographic and social characteristics generally are used
to "attribute need" based on factors that research findings or
social norms indicate are associated with a given problem. For
example, child care subsidies usually are limited to families
with children under 13, based on the belief that older children
can more easily care for themselves or that nonpaid options
may be more readily available.
Second, some benefits are tied to functional statuses in
society, under the assumption that service need is related to
that status or that benefits are earned through some type of
service. In child care, for example, parents need to be employed or in school for a minimum number of hours per week
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to be eligible for child care subsidies. Special health care and
other benefits for veterans serve as an example of the "earned
through service" types of benefits; they are received because
a societal decision has been made that service to the country
should be rewarded with such benefits.
Third, the need for many services is tied to what Gilbert
and Terrell (2010) refer to as diagnostic differentiation, which
generally denotes specific malady-related conditions within a
population that require some form of diagnosis by professionals. For example, although the general age of service receipt
under the CCDF is under 13, services also are provided to
households with older children with special needs. Nursing
home care and special education services in schools are other
prominent examples of services in which eligibility is based
partially on diagnostic differentiation criteria.
The fourth criterion—financial means—is among the most
widely used but also conceptually muddled. The confusion
revolves around whether income is being considered because
of limited ability to pay for services, or because income level
may suggest a need for services regardless of ability to pay.
In the latter case, if study shows that the children of low-income families are more likely to have poor school-readiness
preparation, a strong case can be made for child care or early
learning program eligibility rules that are income-related. For
example, the Head Start program aims to provide comprehensive services to support the mental, social, and emotional
development of children from birth to age five give in lowincome families through agencies in their local community.
The eligibility is largely income based—families must earn
less than 100% of the federal poverty level; a primary reason
for this criterion is that research has found that children from
low-income families often have insufficient early learning opportunities. Generally, however, financial status is more important in thinking about the means through which a benefit
should be provided, as opposed to serving as an actual indicator of service need. We will return to this issue in the following
section on "financial (cost-related access)."
Eligibility criteria such as those discussed above typically screen out many persons in need from the potential pool
for public provision. These persons are depicted in Figure 1
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by the "Uncovered (Direct) boxes." Persons not screened out
in this manner form the largest group that decision-makers
have specified as being eligible for services. Of course, not
all persons in this "eligible" group will subsequently receive
services; the percentage of an eligible population that actually
receives services often is referred to as the "take-up rate" for a
benefit. This brings us to a consideration of the principal mechanisms through which members of this group with "entitlement access" further are screened out from service receipt. As
shown in Figure 1, and described in the following sections, financial, implementation, and individual factors all play a role
in affecting take-up rates and hence further restricting access.
While the forms such restrictions take vary considerably, in
general they are more indirect than the eligibility criteria previously described.
Financial (Cost-related Access)
Program financing can affect program access in three
distinct ways. First, and most directly, the aggregate level of
funding for a program directly impacts the number of persons
served. Especially in discretionary programs, a specific
amount of funding is designated for the program purpose. If
the amount of money provided is insufficient to serve all of
the people who meet eligibility criteria, some people simply
are not served. This restriction on numbers served may be accomplished by instituting a waiting list for services, creating
targeted subgroups for service priority from among those who
meet eligibility requirements, or else simply by closing the
application process when funds are exhausted. For example,
the block grant nature of the CCDF system suggests that total
funding levels may be insufficient to meet demand. Some form
of rationing is needed in such situations, such as by starting
waiting lists or freezing intake. One study found that 18 states
had implemented one or both of these strategies, and that twothirds of single mothers lived in states with waiting lists, suggesting that such practices are important factors in determining access to child care (Herbst, 2006; Schulman & Blank, 2006).
For benefits in which a third party provides services, the
rates paid to service providers constitute a second important
way in which service access may be financially restricted. The
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adequacy of rates varies greatly in social service programs,
and payment rate decisions can significantly affect the extent
to which providers are willing to offer their services. This,
of course, can seriously impact access to the benefit by constraining service supply, and also can compromise the quality
of any benefit provided. In the child care subsidy case, it has
been found that provider reimbursement rates are associated
with increases in subsidy usage among eligible families, and in
particular, that more generous provider reimbursement rates
are associated with greater use of formal sources of child care,
such as center and family-based services (Herbst, 2008).
Finally, access is affected by the financial or other costs that
potential recipients must incur in order to obtain the benefit.
The most direct form of such costs is fees associated with
service receipt, such as the co-payments assessed when CCDF
benefits are obtained. Such costs potentially have two related
but distinct effects on service access. First, if persons are destitute, the inclusion of any fees may preclude access; persons in
need simply cannot afford the payment. Second, for those with
more disposable income, the level of fees may generate an informal cost-benefit assessment concerning the relative value of
the benefit in relation to the assessed fees.
Implementation (Bureaucratic Access)
Even if a person is formally eligible for a program and cost
issues do not preclude service receipt, there are many factors
associated with how a program is implemented that can curtail
access. We refer to these as implementation or bureaucratic
access factors. In some cases, bureaucratic access constraints
may be an intentional strategy designed to restrain demand for
services, such as when application procedures are personally
invasive or workers are trained to discourage potential applicants from applying for services. A classic illustration of such
strategies at their most onerous was the often flagrant inappropriate questioning of African Americans as they attempted
to register to vote during the civil rights era. Such strategies
have been referred to more generally as "bureaucratic disentitlement" (Brodkin, 1997; Lipsky, 1980). However, bureaucratic access constraints also often are unintentional in nature,
and result from the general difficulty in implementing social
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programs in an effective manner. The following sections describe five principal types of bureaucratic access constraints.
Knowledge about services. A fairly wide body of literature
across different types of social services has found that eligible
persons who do not receive benefits often simply do not know
about them, or else believe that they are not eligible (Anderson,
2002). A portion of such non-receipt doubtlessly is attributable to individual characteristics, including educational and
language factors and motivation to apply. However, another
portion, in which we are interested here, is more systematic
and hence falls under the purview of bureaucratic control.
There are many actions that public program managers do
or do not take that can affect knowledge about the availability
of services. In some instances, programs simply do not advertise their services widely, because program managers know
that service demand will outstrip available resources. In this
case, lack of advertising becomes a mechanism for rationing
services, although arguably not a very fair or rational one.
More commonly, systemic problems in information about
available services result from either lack of sufficient resources
for advertising or from substantive inadequacies in advertising. Social service programs routinely are poorly funded, so
program managers often face difficult choices with respect to
how much of a limited budget to allocate to direct service provision versus administrative or other concerns. In such decision-making environments, it is understandable that budgetary attention to advertising services often receives short shrift.
Inadequacies in advertising service availability extend
well beyond monetary limitations. Expertise in developing
a successful outreach and publicity strategy often is lacking
in social service agencies. This can lead to such problems as
unclear or otherwise ineffective presentation of program messages in advertisements; lack of cultural sensitivity in promoting programs; language issues, both in terms of over-reliance
on dominant languages and insensitivity to educational levels
of prospective clients; lack of sophistication in technology use;
and inadequate attention to the primary methods of communication used by potential recipients in various communities.
Problems of this nature have been well-documented in the
child care subsidy program (Adams, Synder, & Sandfort, 2002;
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Fuller et al., 1999; Meyers & Heintze, 1999; Schlay et al., 2004).
For example, Schlay et al. (2004) reported barriers related to
knowledge deficiencies among potential recipients, either due
to lack of knowledge of the existence of subsidies altogether,
or lack of knowledge of the subsidy eligibility rules and the
multiple ways in which subsidies could be used.
Administrative ease of applying for and obtaining services.
Access problems also may be caused by the relative ease of
applying for services, both from administrative and convenience perspectives. With respect to administration, the paperwork and/or interviewing that must be completed to
obtain services is of utmost importance, as are procedures for
maintaining eligibility over time or as circumstances change.
As administrative procedures grow in complexity, they may
impose non-financial transaction costs that applicants view
as too high. Or, even if explicit cost/benefit calculations are
not made, some applicants simply may find the application
process overwhelming. Unfortunately, such administrativelycreated access problems often are likely to fall most heavily
on those with limited education, persons with limited English
skills, or mental health and related problems, as these persons
may have more difficulty managing complex applications. In
the child care subsidy program, for example, it has been estimated that one-third of eligible non-recipients do not apply for
subsidies because of the perceived hassles (Schlay et al., 2004).
Constraints of this type can operate in three distinct ways.
First, people may go to a social service agency to begin the
process of applying for a benefit, but then become discouraged
by the complexity of the process and the types of information
they are asked to supply. Second, even those who complete
initial applications and begin receiving services may subsequently terminate services if administrative reporting and
eligibility re-determination processes are considered ominous
(Adams et al., 2002; Schlay et al., 2004).
The third mechanism through which administrative
procedures may limit access can be quite insidious but also
is difficult to measure. That is, much information sharing
about social benefits occurs through informal contacts in
communities, such as someone who receives a benefit telling
a friend about it. There are two related problems in such
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communications from a service access standpoint. First, if the
person with experience with the service conveys negative information about administrative processes associated with
benefit receipt, some eligible persons may be hesitant to apply.
Second, in some cases misinformation may spread informally
from one person to another, which can lead to persons assuming they are not eligible for a benefit when they in fact are. It
is reasonable to hypothesize that such informal provision of
misinformation is likely to increase as the administrative complexity of programs increase.
Interpersonal treatment by caseworkers and other staff. The
nature of the relationship between service providers and
service recipients is inherently unequal in most situations, with
the former exercising considerable power and the latter typically highly dependent (Handler, 1992). In this atmosphere,
caseworkers and other program staff exercise high levels of
discretion when interacting with service applicants or recipients. This discretion can be exercised in either a positive or
negative manner, often with quite dramatic impacts on client
perceptions about services (Anderson, 2001).
From an access standpoint, these interpersonal interactions
may either encourage or discourage service receipt (Anderson,
2001). Caseworkers who are unfriendly, demeaning to service
applicants, or personally invasive of service applicants or
clients may discourage persons from continuing the application process or service receipt. In contrast, more positive caseworkers may help persons through the application process,
and subsequently assist with service-related difficulties. Again,
the effects of such caseworker behavior are likely to be greatest among applicants or beneficiaries who have the greatest
difficulties in negotiating bureaucratic service environments.
In child care, subsidy staff are critical in shaping the experiences that families have with the subsidy system. They translate policy into practice, communicate details of policies to
parents, help them with forms, process paperwork and claims,
and help identify possible service providers. They are the basic
point of human interaction with the subsidy agency. Research
indicates that parents' experiences with these workers is
highly variable (Adams et al., 2002). In some cases, parents
describe how workers helped them resolve a problem and
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how they were responsive and helpful. However, in other instances, parents describe being treated disrespectfully, having
to wait for long periods of time, being misinformed, having
paperwork lost, and so forth. The effects of these problems on
parents have been argued by scholars to affect subsidy use.
Convenience of office locations and hours. The relative convenience of service receipt also can have important effects on
service access. Most services require at least some face-to-face
meetings to apply for and/or receive services. The relative
effort required of recipients to arrange for necessary meetings
thus may present problems that make services more difficult to
obtain. There are two types of factors that appear most prominent in this respect. First, the physical location of the service
provider may constrain many potential recipients. Locational
issues and related problems of this nature may partially result
from financial issues, in that the amount of program funding
available likely will affect the geographic density of providers. However, problems often extend beyond funding issues,
and may be due to factors such as poor planning in relation to
transportation routes or areas where large numbers of recipients reside.
Non-spatial aspects of convenience also may be important.
For example, many low-income persons work non-traditional hours, so service providers that operate only during daytime hours may present severe obstacles to services receipt.
Likewise, the relative friendliness of offices to clients may
affect a potential applicant or recipient's willingness to visit an
agency, as may many other physical characteristics of agencies
(Meyers, 2000).
Such convenience factors are prominent in child care, and
influence not only whether services are received but the types
of services used. For example, the density of child care providers in various areas varies substantially. Perhaps more important, most child care centers only are open during traditional work hours, and yet many parents need child care while
working swing shifts or at night. Anderson, Ramsburg, and
Scott (2005) found that about 80 percent of child care subsidy
users in their Illinois study required some nontraditional hour
care. Adams et al. (2002) also have described how locational,
convenience, and general office practices can affect child care
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subsidy access.
Supply issues. As mentioned in the previous section on
financial access, the rates paid to providers have important
effects on access. However, the available supply of providers
for any given service often extends beyond such rate issues.
For one thing, bureaucracies differ dramatically in their understanding of their clientele, which can impact provider selection decisions in ways that either encourage or inhibit access.
For example, understanding the racial and ethnic composition
of a population in need may lead to service contracting decisions favoring the selection of minority contractors in some
instances, with the expectation of enhancing access among
certain groups. As mentioned, the adequacy of understanding
the spatial distribution of potential service recipients also can
affect geographic location decisions in ways that can substantially affect access.
Less obvious but still important are the myriad of bureaucratic decisions that structure service relationships between
funding agencies and services providers. For example, if
service reporting requirements are onerous, some providers
may decide that provision is not worth the effort. The amount
of technical support that funding agencies offer to prospective providers also is important, as is the efficiency with which
funders process payments and other administrative information. It should be noted that sometimes there is a fundamental
tension between encouraging service provider participation
and service accountability. That is, greater demands for accountability often result in fairly complicated bureaucratic requirements to document various aspects of service provision.
This complexity, in turn, can reduce access, as some providers
resist the pressure for excessive paperwork.
Individual Characteristics
As mentioned earlier, we treat differences in characteristics primarily as a residual category in this model, because our
focus is on systemic factors controllable by program planners
and administrators. Nonetheless, differences in individual
characteristics have been found to be associated with service
access, so there are obvious interactions between individual
factors and the systemic factors previously discussed.
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The difficulty in this respect is untangling the extent to
which lack of coverage results from systemic barriers versus
differences in individual proclivities and related actions. For
example, educational barriers to access may be related to systemic problems in how information is disseminated, but educational level also may be associated with how much individuals value services and thus seek care. In child care, the fact
that eligible households with higher levels of education are
more likely to receive subsidies may suggest that state administrators are "creaming," such that those with higher skills are
given priority over individuals with potential barriers to employment (Herbst, 2008). However, it also is unclear whether
those with lower incomes or educational levels are less likely
to apply, or if they rather are more likely to seek care from informal caregivers as opposed to child care centers (Anderson
et al., 2005).

Discussion
Although we have used child care subsidy system in
the U.S. to illustrate our access framework in this article, the
Funnel Framework should be applicable in analyzing any
social services system and in varying governmental contexts.
For example, the U.S., as noted, relies substantially on private
markets for social service provision, with governments then
providing residual services for those not being served by
markets. However, the framework similarly is useful in assessing access problems in governmental social systems in which
markets play little or no role. In that case, the portion of the
model depicting private markets in Figure 1 is inconsequential. Similarly, the model is applicable regardless of whether
needs for a particular service are conceived as fairly universal
or more narrowly focused on subpopulations; careful consideration of the "universe of persons for whom a service conceivably is useful" simply requires careful thought in either case
(see Figure 1).
The Funnel Framework can be useful to both researchers and human services professionals as they consider access
issues. From a research perspective, it can help guide studies
intended to assess both the extent and nature of service access
problems. Ideally, such assessments should make the best
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possible estimates of populations in need, as well as of the
numbers experiencing the various types of access problems
depicted in the framework. Doing so can result in the more
precise delineation of prevalent access problems, and related
consideration of programmatic responses. In addition, using
the framework to consistently apply analyses across programs
could expand our understanding of the similarities and differences of access restrictions in various types of programs.
The framework also should be useful in the conduct of
more applied program evaluations. In particular, program
evaluators need to be sure that they systematically explore
the full range of factors that limit program access. By conceptually explicating these factors, the framework can guide the
development of evaluation questions related to each potential
access limitation, and likewise improve the likelihood that distinctions between different types of access questions are not
overlooked in question development and related evaluation
protocols.
From an administrative and policy practice standpoint,
differences in access restrictions have pragmatic implications
for policy and program actions to improve services, and in
turn should influence efforts by human services administrators and by those advocating on behalf of service recipients.
For example, if assessments indicate that access restrictions
derive primarily from constrained eligibility rules, improving access generally will require legislative changes in eligibility for public programs. Similarly, access restrictions that are
estimated to result heavily from financial access factors may
require changes in public appropriation levels, or in additional
fundraising efforts in nonprofit agencies. In contrast, bureaucratic access problems are subject to correction from improved
agency planning and administrative efforts.
Finally, the framework can be very useful as a teaching
aid, especially for social policy practitioners and for those involved in social program development and administration.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no similar comprehensive descriptions of systemic program access limitations
in the research literature or in social policy or administration
textbooks. Presenting the framework to students in policy and
administration classes should be helpful in instruction about
important issues in program design and implementation, and
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also will serve as a teaching aid about the myriad ways in
which social benefits fail to reach persons in need. A related
assignment would be to have students use the framework to
assess access issues as systematically as possible in their own
program of interest.
Limitations, Refinements, and Further Research
The Funnel Framework is a useful extension of the emerging literature concerning how policy and program decisions
and related implementation practices affect access to services.
There are several areas in which the framework is limited, or
in which improved research would facilitate its usefulness.
Probably the greatest problem in maximizing application of the framework concerns the availability of data for
each of the access categories depicted. Such data availability
varies greatly both between the different access categories depicted and between different social service programs. While
acknowledging that such data availability can be a serious
limitation in using the framework to comprehensively assess
access, we would argue that the framework at least should
lead researchers to obtain data for each category for which it
is available. Furthermore, attending carefully to access categories with limited available information should suggest areas
of needed primary data collection that would result in fuller
access information.
A second limitation pertains to the previously mentioned
interaction between private markets and public provision.
While the framework recognizes that these two service mechanisms simultaneously affect each other, it is difficult to ascertain either the extent to which or the precise mechanisms
through which this occurs. The framework consequently takes
the level of private market provision as an initial starting point,
and then focuses on public access issues. Nonetheless, public
policy making affects private provision both directly through
regulations and subsidies, and also indirectly through the
adequacy of public provision. Research strategies that better
assess these complex private and public interactions would
be very helpful in informing broader considerations of service
access.
Finally, we made a conscious decision to build our framework using factors that are clearly systemic in nature. This
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contrasts with some access approaches that begin with considerations of differences in individual characteristics that
may affect access. Nonetheless, further research is needed to
better differentiate how access varies according to individual
characteristics, such as race and education. More sophisticated research in this vein also could help determine the extent
to which such differences reside in individual proclivities or
maladies, as opposed to underlying systemic factors that serve
to discriminate against persons with selected characteristics.
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